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Abstract. After the relationship between form and content in art and law is surveyed and the 
axiomatic approach to systemicity in both philosophy and law of both the classic and 
modern ages is scrutinised, the want of axiomatisability–in presence of correlations between 
axiomatism and law notwithstanding–is established. The very nucleus of any axiomatic 
system is that in some set of building blocks there are few foundation stones from which one 
given overall building can be built up in one given form and with the inherent necessity of 
that the operation, in the security of reaching the same end result, can be repeated by any 
actor at any future time. However, the relationship amongst the constituents of legal systems 
is not such as to allow to make up their edifice in exclusively one form, only if the procedure 
is defined and some constituents as foundation stones are designated. For legal systems are 
truly dynamic systems thoroughly built on substantive interconnections. Therefore they resist–
albeit idealise–axiomatisation. In consequence, exclusively the heuristic value of the 
axiomatic ideal can be fully implemented and scholarly realised in the domain of law. 
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Formalism is a recurrent topic in debates on law without, however, its 
components being analysed to the adequate depth. In the English-speaking 
legal world it takes precedence as the duality or antagonism of form and 
substance1 the fact notwithstanding that its origins in philosophy have once 
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been formulated–as they continue on being termed in the European continental 
culture–in the dichotomy of form and content. 
 
 
I. Systemicity 
 
1. Form and Content 
 
(In Arts and Law)   Facing the challenge of how to define literature and above 
all poetry as its subject, the American New Criticism came to recognise the 
essential moment in the phenomenal form of human objectivations, with 
decisive significance granted to the arrangement of contentual elements in 
some selected way. With the fresh and almost neophyte impulse of the move-
ment, Austin Warren answered the underlying issue by claiming that poetry is 
reducible to the methods it uses.2 Such a reply by one of today’s classics 
(thanks to the Theory of Literature he co-authored with René Wellek3) is rather 
thought-provoking on account of its conciseness. What is even more striking is 
its one-sidedness augmented by its express simplicity. True, this is barely more 
simplified as compared to the one-sidedness in the opposite sense of the old 
formula, held universally valid in abstraction from any real connection, 
according to which content and form are reflexively co-existent. For the New 
Criticism opposed in fact the absolutism of contents, claiming that form can 
also become the generator of contents, at least in some specific domains of 
human artificiality with arts and law included, among others. 
 With human objectivations, formal moments may carry on various features 
and serve a variety of functions. As known, Hegel had once differentiated as 
external forms those components that can be utterly incidental to internal ones 
while also indifferent to the definition of the subject. “In a book, for instance, 
                                                      
of British Columbia Law Review, 32 (1998), 153 et seq.; Katz, L.: Form and Substance in 
Law and Morality. University of Chicago Law Review, 66 (1999) 566 et seq.; Madison, A. D.: 
Tension between Textualism and Substance-over-Form Doctrines in Tax Law. Santa Clara 
Law Review, 43 (2002–2003), 699 et seq.; Bigler, C. S.–Rohrbacher, B.: Form or Substance: 
The Past, Present, and Future of the Doctrine of Independent Legal Significance. Business 
Law, 63 (2007–2008), 1 et seq. 
 2 Warren, A.: Literary Criticism. In: Foerster, N. (et al.): Literary Scholarship. Its Aim 
and Methods. Chapel Hill, 1941, in particular at 143. Cf. also Rákos, P.: Tények és kérdő-
jelek. Tűnődés az irodalmon [Facts and question marks: contemplations on literature]. 
Bratislava, 1971, 17. 
 3 Warren, A.–Wellek, R.: Theory of Literature. New York, 1949. 
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it certainly has no bearing upon the content, whether it be written or printed, 
bound in paper or in leather.”4 
 In everyday life, formal moments play often the role serving as a criterion 
in distinction. Properly speaking, they may, by affording the differentia 
specifica, provide an outer sign identifying the subject and thereby lending it a 
proper denomination, certainly without playing any decisive role in shaping its 
substantial properties. In case of some metals, for example, defining specific 
gravity by indicating the proportion of weight to volume offers an easy way of 
differentiation. Moreover, a complete taxonomy can be achieved this way, 
without the criterion applied being able to furnish any information about the 
sorts of materials classified, besides serving with a merely pragmatic order 
helping classification in practice. In such cases, the distinctive role played by 
formal features, less significant in themselves, may perhaps be primarily 
explained by the particular relation of object to subject in everyday life, 
notably by the outstanding importance of the object’s given features to the 
very subject. 
 Formal features may promote the certainty of recognition and designation 
anyway. In everyday practice, by mentally anticipating some contentual 
definitions issuing from a generalised experience we can select out any object 
classified according to and identified by its particular formal appearance. 
However, in case of law or literary work, mere phenomenal forms are not 
simply external(ised) properties or characteristics of the object in question, 
attached to it constantly or temporarily in a historically sanctioned manner. 
Anything appearing as a legal form (organised at a given hierarchical level 
through given procedures and methods) is only an external expression of 
deeper social relations and interests, that is, of material contents. Nevertheless, 
this very form represents and also embodies the contents expressed, moreover, 
by becoming an alienatingly reified entity, it may even master it.5 And almost 
the same can be told of literature, too. 
 
(In German Philosophysing)    Projected onto human objectivations, we may 
thus safely state the form being–instead of “a kind of envelope which 
  
 4 By Hegel, G. W. F.: Logic. Oxford, 1975. <http://www.kern-ep.de/Internet/ 
Hegels_Logik/appearan.htm> and <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/ 
works/sl/slappear.htm#SL133_1> Also Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften 
im Grundriss [1817], § 133n. <http://pedagogie.ac-toulouse.fr/philosophie/textes/ 
wl131.htm>. 
 5 Cf., by the author: ‘Thing’ and Reification in Law. In his The Place of Law in 
Lukács’ World Concept, Budapest, 1985, 21998, Appendix, 160–184. 
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‘contains’ the ‘content’ ”6–an organic medium of contents, without which the 
latter could hardly be more than dead abstraction, facing the risk of switching 
repeatedly into something else. This is by far not a new realisation. Hegel 
already formulated the dialectic identity of contents and form in a radical 
manner explicating that “the content, as such, is what it is only because the 
matured form is included in it”, “So it comes about that the form is Content: 
and in its phase is the Law of the Phenomenon.”7 Following this course of 
development, neither the founders of Marxism did content with merely 
establishing the mutual transubstantiation of contents and forms into one 
another but also found that an overwhelming role is being played by the former. 
However, not even within that tradition contentual priority must amount to 
nihilising the form. For, according to Lukács, “the specific examination of the 
form is by no means something unnecessary and even less a problem the 
exploration of which were […] opposed to the method of the dialectical and 
historical materialism.”8 
 Returning to the starting point, the original objective of the New Criticism 
was to lead the formal organisation of contents back to the role it is due, of those 
contents which cannot indeed be but the outcome of such an organisation. By 
such a realisation the “heresy of paraphrase” become one of the central 
concerns of the New American Criticism. For, obviously, the production of 
some literary “contents” through non-literary “formless” means would deprive 
the outcome exactly of its specific quality. Due to its normatively posited 
character, the legal form too is strictly inseparable from all its underlying 
contents. Otherwise speaking, no contents can be asserted as specifically legal 
unless organised in/into a legal form. From this perspective, it is quite indifferent 
how we do appreciate the apparent antagonism between the law’s positivistic 
and sociologistic approaches in describing what role of container we ascribe to 
legal form and what criteria we set to it. Irrespective of whether the legal form 
is generated as a text through previously defined procedures or as selected out 
from the actual practice (jurisprudence) of judicial organs or even if–ideally–
it encounters both options to reach their synthesis, all show the emphatic 
  
 6 Brooks, C.: The Well Wrought Urn. Studies in the Structure of Poetry. New York, 
1947, 192, in which case “the ‘form’ [is] conceived as a kind of container, a sort of 
beautified envelope” (226), albeit (as continued on 197) “form and content, or content and 
medium, are inseparable.” 
 7 Hegel, § 133n and 133. <http://www.kern-ep.de/Internet/Hegels_Logik/appearan. 
htm> and <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/index.htm> and 
<http://pedagogie.ac-toulouse.fr/philosophie/textes/wl131.htm>. 
 8 Lukács, G.: Über die Besonderheit als Kategorie der Ästhetik. Berlin–Weimar, 
1985, 156. 
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formalism in anything coming into being as “distinctively legal”.9 Or, the 
“paraphrase” of generating alleged legal contents through extra-legal means 
could only result in the loss of the law’s specific quality: failure in form ending 
in evaporation of substance, i.e., juridicity. 
 Consequently, what is at stake here is not simply “dialectic” identity. In 
addition, it also involves certain condensation of what makes its overall 
substance. In summary of his studies in Hegel, Lenin could only reassert 
that “Form is essential. Essence is formed. In one way or another also in 
dependence on Essence”.10 The form’s essentiality can be varying in diverse 
types of human–societal–objectivation. For example, relating to the aesthetical 
quality of a work of art it has been found that “giving a form is the genuinely 
decisive principle while the aesthetical processing of contents is only 
preliminary to it, meaning but little artistically as stopping there could result–
instead of some poorer artistic performance–nothing in the least in an aesthetical 
perspective.” Although “this lack of independence […] does not change the 
priority of contents”, all this is suitable to show “the form’s decisive, 
independent, finishing function on the work.”11 The basic relationship between 
contents and form is not different in law either. For the processing of contents 
to be objectivated as a law, preceding the act of giving it its due form, is 
theoretically nothing else than “preparatory work […] which–as by itself it 
does not produce anything legally significant, valuable or valid–gains a normative 
character and strength, i.e., legal normativity, exactly in this particular legal 
formulation”, as actually no kind of “legal-normative quality and significance” 
can arise preceding “the actual form-giving phase of the law-making process”.12 
 Or, this emphatic significance attributed to formalism in law may not have 
been emerged by chance in history, as “all the needs of civil society–no matter 
which class happens to be the ruling one–must pass through the will of the 
  
 9 For the duality of how to understand legal form (either as the law’s internal criterion 
or external description) and the need and availability of a synthesis, see, by the author: 
Quelques questions méthodologiques de la formation des concepts en sciences juridiques. 
Archives de Philosophie du Droit, 18 (1973) 205–244. The term ‘distinctively legal’ is 
used by Selznick, P.: The Sociology of Law. In: International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences, 9, ed. D. L. Sills, New York, 1968, 51 et seq. 
 10 V. U. Lenin’s Annotations on Book II (Essence) of Hegel’s Science of Logic in his 
Filosofskie tetradi [Philosophical notebooks] in his Collected Works 38. Moscow, 1960–
1967. 129–164. <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/ch02.htm>. 
 11 Lukács: op. cit. 238 and 240. 
 12 Peschka, V.: Jogforrás és jogalkotás [Source of law and law-making]. Budapest, 
1965, 354, 360 and 357. 
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state in order to secure general validity in the form of laws.”13 As proved by the 
example of bourgeois society, this significance is rooted in the nature of law, 
that is, on the final account, in the very nature and underlying relations of a 
society within which the objectification of the fundamental relationships and 
needs has become the primary condition of survival. The human will getting 
expressed in laws is socially conditioned in view of both their contents and 
form. “The individuals who rule in these conditions [...] have to give their will 
[...] a universal expression as the will of the state, as law”, because “Just as the 
weight of their bodies does not depend on their idealistic will or on their 
arbitrary decision, so also the fact that they enforce their own will in the form 
of law, and at the same time make it independent of the personal arbitrariness 
of each individual among them, does not depend on their idealistic will.”14 
Or, the increased significance given to the actual form of expression involves, 
too, that the shaping of substance–not in any but in one given and exclusively in 
that given way–is no longer an external finishing but has itself been 
transformed into a substantial property, taking a share in the very substance of 
the subject, which will enter the scene as the given organisation of contents, 
moreover, as the substantive moment of the organised contents. 
 In addition to the need of the ruling class to express its will in form of laws, 
the same authors took a stand in their German Ideology also on the inherent 
consequences and side-effects all the above have at the level of both social and 
individual consciousness. For such objectified expressions as “their relations 
assume an independent existence over against them” as “the forces of their 
own life become superior to them” and, embodied by concepts, they offer large 
scope to “illusion” that may conceal or cover up their original determination 
and contents; for “Idea of law. Idea of state. The matter is turned upside-down 
in ordinary consciousness.”15 However, this upside-down turn is by far more 
than a mere appearance, a false image in consciousness that may appear as a 
specific distortion “in ordinary consciousness.” In the case of law as a formalised 
objectivation through institutionalisation, it is “the matter” itself that is turned 
upside-down: as a result of objectification, a ew quality may emerge that 
sublates the old one (negating while retaining it), with the perspective of 
detaching itself from it on principle. To be sure, the formal side of legal 
objectivation is granted a stressed and essentialised significance just for the 
reason that once objectification is perfected, it will have gained own existence 
  
 13 Engels, F.: Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch04.htm>. 
 14 <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch03j.htm>. 
 15 <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01c.htm>. 
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independent of its genesis, that is, in order that it can be applied–even if turned 
against its original determination, and preventing any criticism as may be for 
contents–as a means of social regulation, a pattern of behaviour with 
indisputable validity. 
 Accordingly, the “enchantment” of social relations through their trans-
formation into legal form can also be recognised in the imperfection of their 
translation into abstract rules and in the latter’s deliberately simplifying 
tendency.16 “Enchantment” gets completed when social relations transcribed 
into legal contents will have already lost their original–primary–essentiality, 
sublated into a new quality. 
 Hegel encountered the specifically emphatic role of form where an 
appropriate form was needed, that is, with works of art, where “So far is this 
right form from being unaffected by the content that it is rather the content 
itself.”17 Or, there is a need for appropriate form in law, too, at least partially 
and in a restricted sense. This is the very problem of paraphrase. But certain 
elements of difference have also to be highlighted. Namely, the form 
appropriate in aesthetical quality is the individual form of a unique work of 
art, a concrete totality with a set of formative elements having organised the 
contents, that may have generated aesthetical quality in its uniqueness. In 
contrast, the form appropriate to legal quality is less unique and concrete. 
Otherwise expressed, to reach an aesthetical quality, the form has to be 
regenerated in a concrete and individual manner; for if anyone only “makes the 
aesthetical a priori of the acquisition and formation of reality”,18 will be 
incapable of creating any genuinely aesthetical quality. That is to say that the 
field of aesthetical quality is not formalised. There are no standardised forms 
there. As opposed to it, granting a specifically legal form is the normative a 
priori of the formation. It is indeed the schematic form or blanket formula that 
makes any formation transubstantiated into a legal quality as distinguished 
from anything else. 
 
2. Systemicity and Axiomatic Approach 
 
(The Idea of System and the Law-codes)   It is the law-code’s systemicity as an 
externally distinctive mark that characterises its technological and instrumental 
novelty both comprehensively and substantively. Systemicity as a formal 
  
 16 For an expressive description, see: Szabó, I.: Les fondements de la théorie du droit. 
Budapest, 1973. 
 17 <http://www.kern-ep.de/Internet/Hegels_Logik/appearan.htm>. 
 18 Lukács: op. cit. 159. 
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criterion forms a bridge between the historical proto-forms and the modern 
implementations of the ideal of codification. By breaking up the envelope of 
conceptuality and revealing its individual and particular (historical) layers (as 
in Henrik Ibsen’s drama Peer Gynt did), systemicity will remain the very core 
of any conceptuality as its innermost domain. Or, this is the differentia 
specifica of one of the law’s paths and ways of getting objectified, its sine qua 
non property.19 
 Namely, systemicity as a technical term is in a position rather to suggest 
than to specify given contents. For systems can be constructed on different levels 
with differing structuration and complexity, with degrees of materialisation 
varied in “maturity” and “perfection”. For the time being, the analysis of natural 
dynamic systems not having extended conventionalisedly onto linguistic and 
intellectual ones, general systems theory cannot yet offer a comprehensive 
definition to it. Nevertheless, its notion is suitable to reflect the heterogeneity 
of systemic contents. According to a minimum concept, “A system is a set of 
units with relationships among them.” Or, “A system is a set of objects 
together with relationships between the objects and between their attributes.”20 
According to a more sensitive and stricter definition, covering linguistic-
theoretical systems as well, “A system is: (1) something consisting of a set 
(finite or infinite) of entities: (2) among which a set of relations is specified, 
so that (3) deductions are possible from some relations to other or from the 
relations among the entities to the behavior or the history of the system.”21 
There is a significant difference in degree between the two definitions above, 
although both represent dynamic systems that can be found in both natural and 
social reality. Considering the depth of internal coherence, interdependence 
  
 19 Cf., by the author: Codification at the Threshold of the Third Millennium. Acta 
Juridica Hungarica, 47 (2006) 2, 89–117. 
 20 Bertalanffy, L.: General System Theory, and Hall, A. D.–Fagen, R. E.: Definition of 
System. In: General System Yearbook, 1 (1956), 1–10 and 18–28 and <http://isss.org/ 
projects/general_system_yearbook>. Cf. also Uemov, A. I.: Sistemy i sistemnye issledovannia 
[Systems and systemic research]. In: Blauberg, I. V. (ed.): Problemy metodologii sistemnogo 
issledovania [Problems of the methodology of systemic research]. Moscow, 1970, 68. By 
adding “purposeful formation” as a common generic concept, a similar definition was in 
fact proposed by Sadovskij, V. N. in his K voprosu o metodologicheskikh printsipah 
issledovania predmetov, predstavliaiushchij soboi sistemy [On the question of the 
methodological principles of the investigation of subjects presupposed by their system]. In: 
Suchotin, A. K. (ed.): Problemy metodologii i logiki nauk [Problems of the methodology 
and the logic of science]. Tomsk, 1962. 
 21 Rapoport, A.: General Systems Theory. In: International Encyclopedy of the Social 
Sciences. 15, ed. New York, 1968, 452–453. 
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and self-closure, their difference is by far not in degree but one resulting in 
new quality with those conceptual systems which, due to their logically 
exhaustive deductivity, are indeed axiomatic systems. 
For there is hierarchy among systems. The minimum is perhaps the state 
when some loosely co-related aggregation of objects is scarcely interlaced by 
affinities and when the centripetal forces cementing the system together are 
hardly capable of anything more than neutralising centrifugal forces. The 
maximum may be the state when each and every element of a system is tied to 
all the other ones so closely that owing to their multiple mutual intertwinings, 
each of them will by its very existence strengthen the other, while withdrawing 
any element(s) out of–or, properly speaking, any change made in–the system 
would necessarily collapse the entire system. Thus the course of systemic 
development ranges from some rudimentary stage to the state of axiomatisation 
completed. It is not by chance that Euclid’s Elements has ever served to 
embody the ideal of law-codification in modern times. Within the scope of the 
classical model, “[t]he terms belonging to the theory are never introduced into 
it without being previously defined; the theses are developed in the theory only 
after having been previously proved, except for a small number of them which 
are laid down as principles in the beginning: this way the proof cannot be 
extended to the infinity but has to be founded on some primary theses which 
have been selected excluding any doubt regarding their conceivability in a 
healthy spirit. And although anything proposed is empirically certainly true, no 
reference is made to experience in justification: the geometer pursues only a 
demonstrative route, founding his proofs exclusively onto what has been 
previously proposed, while taking into consideration nothing but the laws of 
logic. This way, any theorem is connected with the chain of necessity to such 
theses from which it has been deduced as a consequence, until a strictly 
enclosed network is gradually reached, in which all theses are directly or 
indirectly interconnected to be eventually concluded in a system, of which not 
any single part could be withdrawn or modified without the whole being 
destroyed.”22 
In law, as early as in proto-forms, codification aimed at written recording 
of the law through its systematic elaboration. The quest for a systematic 
restatement of laws in one textual body emerged historically as functionally 
bound, and its social objectives always thematised the perspicuity and 
conclusion of regulation by its self-closing. Later on, hierarchical structures 
were built in, using a pyramidal construction. The lawyer, the jurisprudent and 
the legal philosopher were mostly led by other motives than inertia moment, 
  
 22 Blanché, R.: L’Axiomatique [1955] 5e éd. Paris, 1970, 9–10. 
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instinct to self-development or pragmatic consideration on how to fulfil the 
ideal–or fall in trap–of axiomatism. Throughout history, the conception formed 
on the availability of axiomatic (re)construction through law codification had 
been closely connected with the idea of (re)structuring legal and social reality. 
 
(Early Modern Times)   Although it was the 19th century to mature codification 
into a classical type, it was the 17th century to enhance ambitions to the law’s 
axiomatic (re)construction. Through the discoveries by Kepler, Galilei, Harvey, 
Gassendi, Huygens, Newton and others, this was the century to attain decisive 
victory of natural-scientific world-view over mediaeval scholastic thought, 
proclaiming the triumph of human intellect in victorious self-assertion of 
middle classes at a time preceding their political success through revolution, 
and granting autonomy recognition to sciences during the grand siècle. The 
sciences themselves were unified according to mathematics’ pattern, in a way 
to prompt Galileo Galilei to declare that the language of nature is set by the 
symbols of mathematics. In one of the milestones of human intellectual history, 
the Discours de la méthode (1637), René Descartes formulated his basic meth-
odological tenets as follows: “The long chains of simple and easy reasonings 
by means of which geometers are accustomed to reach the conclusions of their 
most difficult demonstrations, had led me to imagine that all things, to the 
knowledge of which man is competent, are mutually connected in the same 
way and that there is nothing so far removed from us as to be beyond our reach, 
or so hidden that we cannot discover it”.23 Far from content with establishing 
mere structural similarity, Descartes applied his geometrical notion for mentally 
building up the philosophical-scientific universe on solid foundations through 
irrefutable principles, advancing step by step from the simple towards the 
complex. And just in the way as the stand of cogito ergo sum could become the 
cornerstone of Cartesian rationalism, some maxims taken as universally valid 
could also substantiate the unfolding of law, while in political philosophy, based 
on the assumption of social contract, hypostatasing some natural state (by 
presuming isolated human beings without bonds of institutionally established 
trust amongst them) had to serve as starting point for reasoning. 
 Of course, Cartesian rationalism was not launched in jurisprudence in a 
form achieved and completed like Pallas Athene, by one stroke and fully 
armed. Descartes himself, anticipating later developments, only accomplished 
the summation of progressive methodological tendencies already inherent in 
  
 23 Descartes, R.: Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and 
Seeking Truth in the Sciences. 1637. <http://bdsweb.tripod.com/en/106.htm>. 
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his age. For starting by the 15th century, the progressing course natural sciences 
had been taking instigated jurists to lay the foundations of a new jurisprudence 
which could prove to be scientific, reliable and certain to the degree as the new 
science of Newton and Copernicus did. Accordingly, “many theorists wanted 
to ensure that choices among competing rights [were] constrained by clear and 
unambiguous principles, so that judicial judgment could be separated from the 
uncertainties of political rhetoric and metaphysical theory. The lawyers of the 
Enlightenment were, in a word, looking for a legal science in which certainty 
was guaranteed through method. Ever since the Enlightenment this implied 
that legal story [...] would have to be transformed from a religious fable into a 
scientific dissertation.”
24
 
 Back in the early 17th century, Johannes Althusius investigated law in his 
Dicaeologicae (1617) as part of natural reality, undertaking to describe scholarly 
this specific part of reality. At the same time, he framed his notions–following 
the method of Pierre de la Ramée, i.e., the Ramist logic–into a mathematical 
order. Thus his exposition was patterned by Petrus Ramus (in Latin),25 who 
himself stood on the borderline between the Middle Ages and modern times.26 
Few years later, in 1625, Hugo Grotius erected in his De jure belli ac pacis a 
system of law, deduced with certainty that could only compare to conclusions 
reached in mathematics. For no doubt exists any longer for him. His law is 
quite autonomous a creature as “natural law has become the categorical 
imperative of creation”;27 and the proud words of its Prolegomena also reflect 
this unwavering confidence, freed from church theology and moral philosophy 
alike, only restricted by nature and common sense: “What we have been saying 
would have a degree of validity even if we should concede that which cannot 
be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the 
affairs of men are of no concern to Him.”28 This is how the axiomatic under-
standing of law and codification had gradually taken on a pure, theoretically 
sophisticated form; this is the way in which the great rationalising attempt by 
  
 24 Walt, A. J.: Marginal Notes on Powerful Legends: Critical Perspectives on Property 
Theory. Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg, 58 (1995), 402. 
 25 E.g. Merwe, D.: Ramus, Mental Habits and Legal Science. In: Visser, D. P. (ed.): 
Essays on the History of Law.  Cape Town, 1989. 32 et seq. 
 26 Cf. Villey, M.: La formation de la pensée juridique moderne. Paris, 1968, 588–589. 
 27 Brimo, A. Les grands courants de la philosophie du droit de l’État 2e éd. Paris, 1968, 86. 
 28 Grotius, H.: De jure belli ac pacis. [1625], Prolegomena, sect. II. <http://www. 
lonang.com/exlibris/grotius>. The explication continues by stating that “The very opposite 
of this view has been implanted in us partly by reason, partly by unbroken tradition, and 
confirmed by many proofs as well as by miracles attested by all ages.” 
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modern jurisprudence to reformulate the law within a geometrically inspired 
system of law-codes was finished and consummated. 
 Namely, following the transition by Althusius and the breakthrough by 
Grotius, quite a few jurisprudents ventured the impossible by attempting to 
implement it. The oeuvres of Weigel, Felden, Pufendorf and others are the 
methodical schools of deductive system building. Georg Wilhelm Leibniz was 
one of them, responding to the historical challenge of axiomatism with the 
entire passion of a lifetime’s overall oeuvre, almost identifying his personal 
vocation on Earth with the underlying issue in a way to exert an impact upon 
us with his failures as well, up to the present day.29 
 
(Recent Times)   True, the age of Descartes and Leibniz had passed once and 
for all, and Cartesian rationalism lost its vitality as a philosophical system of 
its own, surviving–like other great heritages of human knowledge–no longer in 
its individuality but as integrated into our culture of the Western knowledge. 
Nevertheless, the attempt at axiomatisation was not just a historical adventure 
but a fundamental logico-methodological challenge to be faced by varying 
ages under differing conditions and scholarly predispositions. To be sure, it was 
not Leibniz the first and Spinoza the last who ventured transforming the 
language of philosophy into mathematics. One of the roughest, strikingly distorted 
versions of the aprioristic method as a “sublime nonsense, the most characteristic 
mass product of Germany’s intellectual industry” practically flooded 19th century 
Germany with which, in preparation of launching the coming new epoch of 
positivism and empirism in scholarship, Engels too entered into passionate 
polemics.30 
 The revival (or renaissance) of axiomatism was accompanied by such and 
similar self-destructively sterile extremities, characterised by the brutal fact 
and inherent irony that, after all, it “yields nothing except a further image of 
itself. It is an elaborate tautology. Unlike numbers, words do not contain within 
themselves functional operations. Added or divided, they give only other words 
or approximations of their own meaning.”31 
  
 29 Cf., by the author: Leibniz und die Frage der rechtlichen Systembildung. In: 
Mollnau, K. A. (ed.): Materialismus und Idealismus im Rechtsdenken. Geschichte und 
Gegenwart,  Stuttgart, 1987, 114–127. 
 30 Engels, F.: Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science. Anti-Dühring. Moscow, 
1947, 13. 
 31 A passage continued by an idea dear to Spinoza: “Language is seen no longer as a 
road to demonstrable truth, but as a spiral or gallery of mirrors bringing the intellect back 
to its point of departure.” Steiner, G.: Language and Silence. Essays on Language, 
Literature, and the Inhuman, New Haven–London, 1998, 20. 
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 Or, the re-emergence of axiomatism with a renewed attempt at breaking 
down the law into an axiomatically erected system is encountered where and 
when a comprehensive methodological foundation, like the one once provided 
by the Cartesian rationalism in 17th century, is made available. Such seems to 
be the case right in our mid-20th-to-early-21st century, when mathematical 
logic and cybernetics and legal informatics and e-government, as instruments 
of the ongoing second-to-third industrial revolution, are to recognise one of 
their forefathers in Leibniz; when Marx is referred to as one of the forerunners 
of mathematisation in social sciences;32 when reasonable, moreover downright 
desirable attempts are made for both the computerisation of legal information 
and the cybernetic approach to law and its codification–with the risk of 
absolutisation, no need to add.33 
 In itself, the claim for the law’s logical processing is by far not to lead 
necessarily to axiomatic system building. Nevertheless, the question of whether 
or not the law’s formal reconstruction will necessarily imply axiomatic 
methodology arises at times, with the ensuing tendency to describe (or, rather 
to say: transcribe) legal operations in schemes of formal logic. The trend 
aiming at a complete and exhaustive formal logical reconstruction of the law’s 
operations (usually referred to as formalist, in opposition to the anti-formalist 
direction)34 does not exclude axiomatic reconstruction from the outset.35 The 
very fact of a literary tradition of vague ideas and uncertain notions about 
axiomatisability in law is shown, for instance, by Josef Esser who, being far 
  
 32 See, e.g., Vospominaniya o Markse i Engelse [Recollections on Marx and Engels]. 
Moscow, 1956, 6, quoted by Kazimirchuk, V. P.: Pravo i metody ego izucheniya [Law and 
the methods of its research]. Moscow, 1965, 166. 
 33 Cf., only from the publications of the Viennese Internationale Rechtsinformatische 
Seminare at Salzburg, Schweighofer, E. (ed.): Zwischen Rechtstheorie und e-Gouverne-
ment, gewidmet Friedrich Lachmayer, Wien, 2003 and Schweighofer, E. (ed.): 10 Jahre 
IRIS. Stuttgart, 2007; as well as those titles including contributions by the present author as 
well, Schweighofer, E. (ed.): Informationstechnik in der juristischen Realität. Aktuelle 
Fragen zur Rechtsinformatik 2004, Wien, 2004, Schweighofer, E. (ed.): Effizienz von e-
Lösungen in Staat und Gesellschaft. Aktuelle Fragen der Rechtsinformatik. Stuttgart, 2005, 
and Jakob, R.–Phillips, L.–Schweighofer, E.–Varga, Cs. (eds.): Auf dem Weg zur Idee der 
Gerechtigkeit. Gedenkschrift für Ilmar Tammelo. Münster, 2009 (forthcoming). 
 34 For the basic controversy between anti-formalism and formalism, see the plenary 
session papers presented at the World Congress of the International Association for 
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in Brussels in 1971, most eminently by 
Perelman, C.: Le raisonnement juridique, 1–15 and Kalinowski, G.: Le raisonnement 
juridique, 17–42, both in Die Juristische Argumentation. Wiesbaden, 1972. 
 35 E.g., Kalinowski, G.: Introduction à la logique juridique. Paris, 1965. 
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away from formalism personally,36 uses the dichotomy of “axiomatically 
oriented” and “problem-oriented” all along his work.37 He conceives these 
opposites as synonymous to “closed system” presupposed by codification, on 
the one hand, and “open system” operating with case law, on the other.38 – 
This same approach is solidified by Julius Stone’s definite assertion, according 
to which “If a legal order were designed to contain within itself a sufficiently 
comprehensive set of legal propositions precise and stable enough in meaning 
so that only one answer could be deduced from them for every problem 
presented for legal solution, those who operated with it would need to use 
only formal logic. [...] Such a legal order would be an axiomatic system–an 
axiomatics–like geometry or algebra.”39 To be sure, logical conclusion does by 
no means presuppose an axiomatic structure, albeit by axiomatic character 
Stone exclusively means the logically operated nature of premises. His remark 
adds somewhat absolutistic a form to his thesis, claiming that “Clearly even 
the most axiom-oriented legal system will be only very imperfectly so, while 
even the most rhetorically, (that is, tópoi-) oriented legal order has within it 
numerous axiomatic sub-systems, some of its legal prepositions being apt for 
use as premises from which solutions can properly be deduced through 
stringent logical procedures. We are, indeed, accustomed to viewing a legal 
order as axiomatic to some extent, that is, as containing many major premises 
from which answers to legal questions can be deduced in a logically 
guaranteed way.”40 
 Reverting to the German school of legal logic with strong axiomatic 
flavour, one of its most distinguished representatives, Ulrich Klug, treats both 
axiomatic system-building and the lawyers’ desire for the law’s axiomatic 
codification.41 At the same time, he consistently avoids raising the dramatic 
issue, notably, its genuine feasibility. Apparently he is not even aware of the 
lack of deductivity from the law’s notional structure and systemic components. 
On the final account and paradoxically, the only specific remark he has is 
echoing Bochenski’s opinion on that every language, even if not elaborated, is 
  
 36 Cf. Stone, J.: Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasoning. London, 1964, 195. 
 37 “A logically closed system–J. Esser writes in his Grundsatz und Norm in der 
richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatrechts. 4th ed. Tübingen, 1990, 218–on the top of 
which there are deductively fertile major premises is axiomatically oriented.” [„Ein logisch 
geschlossenes Rechtssystem, an dessen Spitze deduktiv ergiebige Obersätze stehen, haben 
wir als axiomatisch orientiert bezeichnet.”] 
 38 Esser: op. cit., especially at 44. 
 39 Stone: op. cit. 330. 
 40 Ibid., 332. 
 41 Klug U.: Juristische Logik. 3. Aufl. Berlin, 1966, 15–16 and 174–176. 
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spirited by axiomatism.42 – Ilmar Tammelo goes further in offering an answer 
when he criticises the view arising out of “blind obscurantism” which holds as 
if it were the mere self-centred wish of logicians to systematise law axiomatically. 
But in fact, when he answers that “it is up to legal policy to decide whether or 
not the axiomatisation of law shall take place without the logician having any 
competence. Yet once a decision is taken, the logician may help”, he seems 
responding the enigma in terms of professional competence in scholarship 
rather than in terms of realisability in practice.43 – Finally, Ota Weinberger 
treats axiomatism, too, as just one of logical methods, without entering into 
details as to its difficulties when applied to law. All he concludes is reduced to 
a blank prophecy, saying that “the logical analysis of legal thought is going to 
lead to the elaboration of pure deductive systems”.44 
 In addition to renewed approaches to axiomatism in law,45 there is a specific 
impetus that may have promoted axiomatism in the codes’ systematisation of 
law. This is the systemic investigation into conceptual sets, launched rather as 
a requirement than as a modest achievement. 
 
(Drawbacks in Philosophy)   The tradition of systemic investigation into 
conceptual sets in philosophy is hardly sufficient for seconding the efforts in 
jurisprudence. Firstly, it concentrates on the analysis peculiar to philosophical 
systems. Secondly, drawing mainly on Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft,46 
both its issues and entire notional framework are inspired by the methodological 
limitations set by Kantianism, old and new.47 
 As to the general systems theory and similar interdisciplinary trends, they 
are mostly preoccupied with dynamic systems in material and social reality. 
Consequently, conceptualisation in actual systems is secondary for them, seen 
mostly as a program to be addressed, if at all, in future. 
 Considering the fact that neither theory of science nor scientific methodology 
have made striking progress on the field, formal logic has remained in charge 
of conducting research on conceptual systems. And indeed, logic can successfully 
  
 42 Bochenski, I. M.: Die zeitgenössigen Denkmethoden. 2. Aufl. München, 1959, 
quoted by Klug, 16 and 174. 
 43 Tammelo, I.: Rechtslogik und materiale Gerechtigkeit. Frankfurt am Main, 1971, 48. 
 44 Weinberger, O.: Rechtslogik. Wien–New York, 1970, 362. 
 45 E.g., Ferrajoli, L.: Teoria assiomatizzata del diritto, Parte generale. Milano, 1970 as 
well as Wróblewski, J.: Axiomatization of Legal Theory. Rivista internazionale di filosofia 
del diritto, 49 (1972) 3. 380–389. 
 46 Kant, I.: Critique of Pure Reason [Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1781]. 
 47 See, e.g., Bartók, Gy.: A ‘rendszer’ filozófiai vizsgálata [Philosophical investigation 
of the ‘system’]. Budapest, 1928. 
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utilise its entire store of analytic instruments for systems research; the terrain, 
however, where it can make full use of its properties to achieve results suited 
to such a purpose is but its most narrow field, notably, axiomatics. Therefore 
the circumstance that research in conceptual systems is carried out unchangedly 
within the competence of logic has eventually deformed research itself, by 
diverting it onto the forced path of axiomatics. Thereby the very method of 
analysis creates an object for itself. Firstly, it addresses the subject with means 
and approach alien to the subject’s own specificity. Secondly, this discrepancy 
with latent antinomy in between subject and approaching to it gets expressed 
in the subject’s manipulation, equalling to distortion and falsification. Thirdly, 
axiomatism prevails with a subject transubstantiated. Or, what may have 
initially been a legal system, a mobile and dynamic conglomerate of both 
logical and alogical components, is going to eventually become a series of 
deductive conclusions, rigidified and broken into a construction unfolded and 
crystallised by the manipulator’s axioms. 
 
 
II. Axiomatism 
 
1. The Want of Axiomatisability 
 
(From Deductivity to Axiomatisation)   For an external observer, human 
knowledge appears in form of written texts, involving a definite store of 
concepts with relations established amongst them. These texts contain pieces 
of information at various levels. Propositions and the linguistic units carrying 
them textually are formulated not inordinately but as organised according to a 
given order, mutually co-related as components of a well-constructed intellectual 
system. The order manifested in such texts is neither self-determining nor set 
for itself. It is designed to represent the connections of the object which the 
text has to express on a conceptual level. However, the underlying order may 
have concurring notional representations. For the representation to be adequate, 
its basic substantive features need to be identical. Or, the notionally schemed 
order has to be partly natural yet partly artificial, reconstructed and constructed 
at the same time.48 
  
 48 In its time, the Soviet philosophical literature elaborated the thesis of correspondence 
between formal and contentual components, and called it the principle of “parallelism of 
form and contents of thought”. Accordingly, their parallelism was thought to be based 
upon the relative independence of both sides with exclusive operations within their basic 
correspondence. Shtshedrovitskiy, G. P.–Alekseev, N. G.: Printsip parallellizma ‘formy i 
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 In case the components of a system are grouped in a way that its theses 
are logically to conclude from one another as necessary consequences, both 
their connection and the system itself qualify as deductive ones.49 The further 
development of deductive systems by re-formulating them at a qualitatively 
higher level leads to axiomatisation. As a strictly consequent formal perfection 
of the deductivity of systems, axiomatisation amounts to the formal description 
(or reconstruction) of an already established system, elaborated exclusively in 
a deductive order. Axiomatic reconstruction is achieved through meta-
language formulation of theses specified in object-language provided by the 
underlying system. Its phases are rather strict as to the conditions to be met. At 
first, (1) the basic signs to be applied in the system are defined, followed by 
(2) the definition of the formulas suitable to provide the expressions of the 
system, then followed by (3) the selection of the basic propositions (axioms) 
from the formulas defined above as well as by (4) the determination of the 
(deductive) rules of inference (or derivation) to be accepted in the system, and 
finally, to be ended by (5) the conclusion of all the theses (theorems) provable 
within the system, according to the same accepted rules of inference.50 
 
(Futile Approximations at the Most)   By projecting the Aristotle-inspired 
definition of axiomatic systems51 onto the law after having performed the 
necessary substitutions,52 we do reach the conclusion according to which the 
law can be conceived of and also treated as “a system S of normative concepts 
and propositions, whose property is that (a) all theses of S relate to the same 
domain of human behaviours and the relations among such behaviours; (b) all 
                                                      
soderzhaniia mysleniia’ i ego znachenie dlya traditsionnyh logicheskih i psihologicheskih 
issledovanij [The principle of parallelism of ‘form and content of thought’ and its 
significance for the traditional logical and psychological research]. Doklady Akademii 
Pedagogicheskih Nauk RSFSR, (1960), paras. 2 and 4. 
 49 Sadovskij, V. N.: The Deductive Method as a Problem of the Logic of Science. In: 
Tavanec, P. V. (ed.): Problems of the Logic of Scientific Knowledge. Dordrecht, 1970, 
160–211 and 168. 
 50 Sadovskij: op. cit. 173 and 187. 
 51 Klaus, G.: Einführung in die formale Logik. Berlin, 1959. 290. 
 52 The replacement of the category Urteil [‘judgement’] by ‘theses’ and the use of 
‘validity’ instead of Wahrheit [‘truth’]. For the intense debates they have otherwise rightly 
provoked, cf. Peczenik, A.: Doctrinal Study of Law and Science. Österreichische Zeitschrift 
für öffentliches Recht, 17 (1967) 1–2, 129–131 and 134–135; Opałek, K.: The Problem of 
Validity of Law. Archivum Juridicum Cracoviense, 3 (1970) 7–18; and as to the analogy 
between ‘validity’ and ‘truth’, Wright, G. H.: Norm and Action. A Logical Enquiry, London, 
1963, 196–197. 
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theses of S are valid; (c) providing that certain theses belong to S, every further 
thesis inferable from these according to the rules of logic has to belong to S; 
(d) there has to be a finite number of concepts in S whose meaning needs no 
explication, and the meaning of all other concepts belonging to S has to be 
definable by that finite number of concepts; (e) there has to be a finite number 
of theses in S whose validity is evident, and all the further theses of S are 
inferable from that finite number of propositions according to the rules of 
logic.” 
 The condition (a) refers to the unity of legal regulation in a wider sense. 
Condition (b), a sine qua non one for descriptive propositions stipulating that 
“all judgements of S are true judgements”, is tautologic in law as accepted 
per definitionem from the very start. Condition (c) formulates a necessary 
presupposition for any logical treatment of law, postulating in doctrine [Rechts-
dogmatik]53 that both the posited norms and their logical consequences are to 
be taken as propositions of the law at the same level and to the same effect.54 
 As to condition (d), the first specific requirement for the law’s axiomatisation, 
we are now to encounter rather difficult dilemmas. In the first moment, how-
ever, a compromise solution may seem to offer itself. For instance, we could 
presume that both posited law and its doctrinal study (engaged in the law’s 
linguistico-logical processing into a semantically higher-level meta-system), 
together with the set of principles asserted in standing jurisprudence and its 
underlying professional ideology, are to embody those principles of interpretation 
through which the meaning of the law’s fundamental concepts can be established 
as evident, and the meaning of all the further concepts as validly accepted.55 
However, the neuralgic point is not here but on deductive sequence, on the 
inferability of concepts allegedly derived from some fundamental concepts in 
the given axiomatic system. 
  
 53 Cf. by the author: Law and its Doctrinal Study (On Legal Dogmatics). Acta Juridica 
Hungarica, 49 (2008) 3, 253–274. 
 54 E.g., Wróblewski, J.: Zagadenienia teorii vykladni prawa ludowego. Warszawa, 
1959, 248 and 482, as well as Peczenik: op. cit. 131–134. 
 55 A similar approach is suggested by Wróblewski Zagadenienia teorii…, passim; 
Ross, A: On Law and Justice. London, 1958, 138–139; and Jørgensen, S.: Argumentation 
and Decision. In: Festkrift til professor dr. jur. et phil. Alf Ross. København, 1969. as well. 
In fact, all such approaches share the conviction that meaning in law is a function of 
contexture and that the law’s social context of interpretation is part of that contexture. Cf., 
by the author: On the Socially Determined Nature of Legal Reasoning. Logique et Analyse 
16 (1973), Nos. 61–62 and in: Perelman, C. (ed.): Études de logique juridique V. Bruxelles, 
1973, 21–78. 
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 If this is so, then law is unsuited to axiomatisation by virtue of the very 
nature of its concepts, considering the fact that in any system-constructing 
quality the very sinse of deductivity is alien to them. Or, the basic condition of 
the law’s axiomatisability remains unfulfilled already at a conceptual level. For 
no law has fundamental concepts with meanings evident in themselves; no 
principles of interpretation are exhaustively defined by or construable from the 
system; moreover, the law’s concepts are not necessarily inferable from within 
the system. 
 Finally, condition (e), specific to law, raises drawbacks even more insur-
mountable. 
 
 (1) A preliminary remark has firstly to be made. Condition (b) stipulates 
that “all theses of S are valid” and condition (e) stipulates that “there has to be 
a finite number of theses in S whose validity is evident”. Accordingly, we have 
already stated that all the law’s components have to be held valid, as the 
amalgamate of valid and invalid elements in law is per definitionem excluded. 
Indeed, a number of interpretive principles, enacted rules as well as professional 
maxims have for long been developed to deprive propositions with no validity 
within or incompatible with the system of their belonging to that system.56 
Nevertheless, law is a specific continuum in the unbroken process of norms 
gaining and losing validity, a continuum with boundaries constantly forming in 
time.57 (As it can be noticed, we are focussing here on the formal–positivistic–
aspect of the very complex notion of validity.58 Although this fits in better with 
the specific direction our investigation is taking, the sociological approach to 
the notion of validity would cause no change in accepting validity as a prime 
criterion.59) 
 All that notwithstanding, the category of truth (expressing correspondence 
between reality and its cognition in epistemology) and the one of validity 
(designating the legally normative quality of the regulation) do not have the 
same position when complying with the above conditions. For in case of 
descriptive propositions, there is a close and somewhat intimate relationship 
between the truth and the evidence of truth, an organic coupling which is quite 
alien to norm-propositions. The evidence of truth is revelative of contents and 
of the quality how they are reflected. The evidence of validity tells only about 
  
 56 See, e.g., Wróblewski Zagadenienia teorii…, op. cit. 282 adn 481. 
 57 Cf., by the author: Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999, 
particularly at para. 6.1. on 203 et seq. 
 58 Cf., by the author: Validity. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 41 (2000) 3–4, 155–166. 
 59 Cf., by the author: Quelques questions …, passim, especially at 601. 
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the respective norm’s belonging to–by sharing in–the law’s overall normativity.60 
In contrast to the evidence of validity, the evidence of truth cannot be self-
explanatory or tautologic. In his Philosophical Notebooks, also Lenin identified 
the source of axiomatic evidence in the justificatory power of the continuity of 
man’s practical activity,61 concluding therefrom that axioms “are not true 
because they are evident, but they are evident because they are true”.62 No 
“transcript” in law of such an allegation–claiming that “norms are not valid 
because they are obvious but they are obvious because they are valid”–could 
lead to any plausible result. The norm acquires normative form by gaining 
normative expression in order to become separated from both epistemological 
truth and ontological necessity, in a way of being also freed of disputability 
any longer. This refers to the very fact that validity (like any other element of 
norm systems) appears as “an artificial human construction”,63 a result of 
man’s social activity. Simultaneously, it gets applied as a criterion set vis-a-vis 
norm systems as a sine qua non of the legal qualification of reality. Otherwise 
speaking, it has a constructive role in the specific establishment of the law’s 
quality as “distinctively legal”. 
 
 (2) Our genuine problem relate only to the second phrase of condition (e), 
implying the cardinal query for the sine qua non condition of selecting axioms 
from theses of the system, in order to construct it deductively this way. 
 Namely, law can be conceived as an axiomatic system in two ways. 
 According to alternative (A), the total sum of the laws’ posited provisions 
shall be taken simply as a set of axioms. Then the posited body of the law with 
all its logical consequences will stuff the axiomatic system as a series of 
axioms, and the theses elaborated by the law’s doctrinal study, concluded 
deductively therefrom, as theorems. According to alternative (B), distinction is 
  
 60 Of course, the kind of validity referred to here accords with its positivistic under-
standing. Validity in a positivistic sense is indifferent to contents, so it carries the law’s 
specificity–the “distinctively legal” quality–in a most pure form. Its sociologistic sense 
(which instead of signalling mere belonging–or ascription–to the system, describes actual 
functioning) remains a formal category on the whole. It asserts the normative quality of 
norm-propositions belonging to the legal system through their being asserted by (and in) 
judicial acts and other sociologically significant events. Besides these two senses, one may 
specify its contentual understanding as a further notion of validity. This relates to the value 
of norm-propositions some instrumental value (functionality, suitability, desirability, abstract 
acceptability, and so on), in view of the law’s purposes accepted in a given circle. 
 61 <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/cw/volume38.htm>. 
 62 Quoted by Klaus: op. cit. 291. 
 63 Ibid.  72. 
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to be made between provisions that provide fundamental regulation and ones 
only executing the former as subordinate to it. Either solution can only be 
accepted as failing presupposition. 
 
 (Ad A) The first alternative of axiomatic system-construction is redundant 
as it can only offer a pseudo-solution. The qualification of the total sum of 
enacted provisions as axioms would deprive this artificial system exactly of its 
specific–axiomatic–character, for the selection of axioms would exclusively be 
directed by a wholly external factor, namely, by the act of the legislator having 
posited those provisions. In case if axiomatic quality is not defined by the 
suitability of the proposition in question to serve as a foundational stone for 
system construction, we may scarcely speak of an axiomatic system.64 
  
 Ad B) By selecting axioms, the other alternative, too, is to bring artificial 
division in the system, as it will distinguish between axioms and normatively 
posited and not posited propositions as logically inferable theorems. 
 In order to overcome artificiality, we could state that as regards the validity 
of contents, both normatively posited and not posited propositions, once 
logically inferable, are equivalent. Nevertheless, a division as outlined above 
could not be without problems. Partly because it is likely that we should select 
our axioms by far not exclusively from among the law’s hierarchically upgraded 
provisions (from a Basic Law or a code’s General Part with fundamental 
principles of the regulation). By this, we would unavoidably contradict the 
very spirit of the structured law and the normative significance attributed to it. 
And partly because there is high probability for axioms getting selected not 
only from the law’s normatively posited stuff but of creating some of them, 
through mental (re)construction, as logical premise to some normatively posited 
provisions. Accordingly, our system would be constructed as an artificial set of 
four components, namely, normatively (1) posited and (2) not posited axioms 
and their normatively (3) posited and (4) not posited logical consequences, 
taken as theorems.65 
  
 64 Opałek, K.–Wolenski, J.: Das Problem der Axiomatisierung des Rechts. Later in: 
Winkler, G. (ed.): Rechtstheorie und Rechtsinformatik. Wien–New York, 1975. 51–66, also 
foresaw such a solution (on 15–16) by accepting its set as a class of independent norms 
(axioms). Without objecting to or refuting it, they concluded that it cannot be but of a 
“minimum value” in practice. 
 65 Opałek & Wolenski, 16 also find this option feasible for a procedure when, first, 
axioms are inductively formulated from the posited stuff of norms, and then, the system’s 
theorems are deduced from them. The criticism the authors exert seems however to focuss 
on a secondary point. The issue of deducibility being left untouched, they are only 
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 One of the prerequisites of axiomatisation according to condition (d) has 
been a network of concepts constituting the system that can be arranged in a 
deductive order. However, as we have seen, concepts of law are not of such a 
type. In law, as known, it is by far not only concepts that resist getting trans-
formed into a deductive chain of consequences. For propositions defining the 
mutual relationships and connections amongst concepts withstand deductivity, 
too, by virtue of their nature shared with one of concepts. Posited law is 
scarcely stuffed with norms deducible from the law’s other norms in a formal, 
strictly deductive way.66 Propositions fundamental to delineate the contents of 
legal systems mostly appear as delimitations–actualisations and concretisations–
of purposes set forth by high-level politico-legal documents, the normative 
regulation of which will mostly provide the definition of those instrumental 
behaviours which have been selected by the legislator to achieve the desired 
aims. This is the reason why both the basic arrangement and its regulation in 
details–often distinguishable through a thorough analysis of contexture 
exclusively–are provided by the legislator and in a normative way.67 Whereas, 
if we were indeed in a position to rely on deductivity, the legislator could 
safely leave the job of deducing systemic theorems from given axioms to either 
the professionals of doctrine or the law-applier. 
 Or, as expounded elsewhere,68 processes of law-application cannot be 
reduced to deductive operations. Accordingly, attempts throughout history at 
eliminating par excellence creative moments from judicial processes were 
always bound to failure.69 Neither doctrinal study can be based upon mere 
deductivity.70 In the law’s proper domain, be it either made or applied, instead 
                                                      
preoccupied with the consequence that such an implementation will inevitably exceed 
the boundaries of the underlying system and result in a “substantial overextension”, 
unacceptable for a Rechtsdogmatik. 
 66 Wróblewski: Axiomatization…, op. cit. especially at 380–381. The structure of legal 
systems is described as a complex–at the same time dynamic and static–entity in his System 
of Norms and Legal System. Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto, 49 (1972) 2, 
224–245, especially on 228–229 and 236. 
 67 Cf., by the author: Structures in Legal Systems: Artificiality, Relativity, and Inter-
dependency of Structuring Elements in a Practical (Hermeneutical) Context. Acta Juridica 
Hungarica, 43 (2002) 3–4, 219–232. 
 68 Cf. Varga: On the Socially Determined..., op. cit. passim. 
 69 Cf., by the author: A törvényhozó közbenső döntése és a hézagproblematika meg-
oldása a francia jogfejlődés tükrében [The interim decision by the legislator as a way of 
filling gaps, as overviewed through the French legal development]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 
26 (1971) 1, 42–45. 
 70 E.g., Peczenik: Doctrinal Study of Law…, op. cit. 135–138. 
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of purely formal logical connections there are only interrelations of contents, 
which delimit the field of formal deductivity to a sheer hyperbolic ideal. 
 
(Lack of Deductivity in the Law’s Deep Structure)   The very nucleus of any 
axiomatic system is that in some set of building blocks there are few 
foundation stones from which one given building can be built up in one given 
form with the necessity that the operation, in view of the result, can be 
repeated by any actor at any future time. However, the relationship amongst 
the constituents of legal systems is not such as to allow to make up their 
edifice in exclusively one form, if its axiomatic procedure is defined and some 
constituents as foundation stones are designated. The principle of deductivity 
is at the heart of all axiomatism. The eventual lack of the deductivity of legal 
concepts affects directly the alternative (B) only. The alternative (A) seems not 
to be excluded as a job to be undertaken. Or, this alternative could be realised 
without, however, bringing us closer to the gist of legal axiomatism. Its 
acceptance would be like claiming to explain the structure of a building by 
defining its construction procedure and one or two foundation stones assigned 
to it, but presenting in fact the whole edifice with each and every (different) 
piece of stone built in as foundation stones, and with each and every concrete 
(different) manner of their building in as fundamental procedures. 
 
2. The Heuristic Value of an Ideal 
 
(Cases of N/A)   As the basic characteristics of axiomatic systems are not 
applicable to law, we have to regard legal systems as non-axiomatic and not 
axiomatisable ones. 
 As to the further, accessory properties of axiomatic systems, neither the 
principle of the independence of axioms71 nor the one of irreducibility72 is 
applicable in law. For providing that we accept all the normatively posited 
provisions of the system as axioms (proposal (A)), we exclude the above 
principles from the outset. Providing that we accept exclusively the system’s 
elaborated basic principles as axioms (proposal (B)), we do presume those 
principles already fulfilled from the very beginning. 
  
 71 According to which none of the axoms can be deduced from any other, serving as the 
latter’s theorem. Klaus: op. cit. 303. 
 72 Fulfilled as an improved version of the former, “if each axiom of the system is 
independent of the conjunction of the other axioms”, that is, “if both this very axiom and 
its logical negation are logically compatible with the conjunctions of the others”. Klaus: 
op. cit.  321. 
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 One of the advantages of axiomatic system construction is that by revealing 
the identical structure of seemingly differing theoretical and practical systems, 
it allows them to be analysed collectively and synthesisingly.73 This collectivity 
is introduced by the term of isomorphy in logic. Namely, “[i]f the models 
differ only in the different character of the specific interpretations regarding 
their components, and if they coincide totally when we disregard this for the 
sake of their treatment on a formal axiomatic plane, we say that the models in 
question are of an isomorphous character as they have quite identical a logical 
structure”.74 
 Well, in the domain of law, if we cannot speak of isomorphy among systems, 
the question itself becomes pointless. Although quite a few isomorphous 
structures can certainly be encountered among various institutions within given 
legal systems, their examination points beyond axiomatics. Consequently, also 
dependence–namely, “if the system itself or its logical negation can be inferred 
from the other”–is quite alien to legal systems, thus–apart from some exceptions 
in the domain of the techniques of legislation75–we may conclude that any 
legal system is “logically incidental” compared to other systems.76 
 
(Cases of Correlation)   However, it does not result from the law’s inherently 
non-axiomatic composition that legal systems could not carry features inter-
pretable within an axiomatic perspective.77 Even the law’s geometric ideal can 
only gain a meaning in history if the law has a genuine façade suitable to be 
  
 73 Cf., e.g., Blanché: L’axiomatique…, op. cit. ch. IV, § 23. Lukács too, albeit opposed 
(as flatly hostile) to any formalism in general, welcomed the tendency towards “the 
mathematisation of all sciences”. Lukács, Gy.: A különösség mint esztétikai kategória 
[Particularity as an aesthetical category]. Budapest, 1957, 149–150. 
 74 Blanché: op. cit. 46. 
 75 Obviously, there is isomorphy in the exceptional cases of promulgating the same 
statutory texture in separate jurisdictions. Yet this is irrelevant for logic. Reception of legal 
texts can become relevant for isomorphy only provided that either the same basic 
principles are broken down differently in detailed regulations or differing basic principles 
will be asserted in the same texture of regulation. Properly speaking, this is not the issue of 
isomorphy to be at stake. Isomorphy is related to the identical structure of systems 
differently interpreted, while reception with variations testifies only to the dialectics 
inherent in the demand for harmony between basic principles and their detailed breaking 
down in a regulatory concretisation. 
 76 Klaus: op. cit. 321.  
 77 E.g. Savigny, E.: Zur Rolle der deduktivaxiomatischen Methode in der Rechts-
wissenschaft. In: Jahr, G.–Maihofer, W. (ed.): Rechtstheorie. Beiträge zur Grundlagen-
diskussion. Frankfurt am Main, 1971, 315–351 and Rödig, J.: Axomatisierbarkeit juristischer 
Systeme. In: Rödig, J.: Schriften zur juristischen Logik. Berlin, 1980, 65–90. 
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brought into connection with the characteristics of axiomatism in some way. 
Or, our basic rejection will reckon with moments suggesting a certain 
connection notwithstanding. 
 Although, according to the general theory of science, “[t]here is something 
asserting itself as a rule in the development of sciences, driving them in an 
irreversible sequence in function of their place in the hierarchy along four 
subsequent phases, that is, the descriptive, the inductive, the deductive, and, 
finally, the axiomatic ones”,78 yet we may agree with Klaus that “there is no 
science which could exclusively be axiomatic-deductive”.79 For not even the 
focus of axiomatisation on formal definition can exclude that–methodologically 
speaking–axiomatics will be acknowledged as the endpoint of all processes 
arising from the analysis of any concrete totality of material or intellectual 
phenomena. “It may occur only in books that axiomatics begins with axioms, for 
with the axiomatician it is just the axioms where it ends. Namely, axiomatics 
presupposes substantive deduction to which it gives a shape, which requires 
lengthy inductive preliminary work in collecting the materials to be organised 
this way. On such a basis, the axiomatician’s genuine job will be to identify 
axioms, that is, instead of drawing mere consequences from given principles, 
he will have, once a set of propositions is given, to find the minimum system 
of those principles from which the propositions in question can be deduced.”80 
This is but a concretisation in logic, the epistemological formulation of which 
was already provided by Engels in his crude polemics with Dühring: “The 
general results of the investigation of the world will only be obtained when 
the investigation is already over: these are results in accomplishment rather 
than basic principles to start on. To construct the former mentally through 
concluding from the latter as reliable basis in order to reconstruct the world is 
sheer ideology”.81 
 
 Or, axiomatic system building is by far not simply a game with signs for 
themselves, a futile exercise in some vacuum, but a way of systematising 
knowledge itself. Accordingly, its pattern may become an instrument of the 
  
 78 Blanché: L’axiomatique… op. cit. 84. 
 79 Klaus: op. cit. 325. 
 80 Blanché: op. cit. 87. 
 81 Engels, F.: Anti-Dühring. In: Marx, K.–Engels, F.: Werke, 20. Berlin, 1987, 574. 
Or, formulated elsewhere in the same developments, “the principles are not the starting-
point of the investigation, but its final result; they are not applied to nature and human 
history, but abstracted from them”. <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/ 
download/Engels_Anti_Duhring.pdf>. 
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theoretical appropriation of the world, albeit its suitability is by far not 
unlimited. Moreover, if we stated beforehand that there is no system exclusively 
axiomatic, now we may risk the opposite-direction statement, namely that 
there is no system with absolutely no features of axiomatism. For absolute 
axiomatism is an empty category so much as absolutely no axiomatism is. 
 The two pillars of axiomatic system building is formal construction and its 
deductive definition. These are basically not proper to law, yet they may have 
some aspects within the perspective of which they may become method-
ologically significant for it. For instance, the very fact that “in the axioms of 
the Euclidean geometry, all propositions of this geometry are in principle 
involved,”82 is characteristic of all axiomatic systems. Among norm systems, 
there are in principle–as theoretical models–so-called static systems, in which 
the basic norm of validity elevates–by delineating the system’s contentual 
boundaries as a general condition of validity, and with the rules of inference 
given–the whole system to be a logical consequence of the basic norm.83 No 
need to say that such systems are scarcely set up anywhere in practice. Yet in 
law, norms authorising the issuance of, or extending validity to, certain 
subordinate norms may be defined in a way that the conformity (e.g., constitu-
tionality) of the latter to this hierarchically higher level can be adjudicated, for 
instance, on the basis of the particular deducible from the general, or of its lack 
of contradictions, or of its recognition as embodying an instrumental value. 
On the other hand, there are general principles in law-codes, which may 
matter especially when treated quasi-axiomatically in the delimitation of the 
generalisable features of the details of the regulatory arrangement, as well as 
when decision is to be made in atypical or borderline cases, or when just filling 
gaps in the law are at stake. Or, the contentual superiority of general principles 
in so-called code systems84 does by far not amount to their suitability to be 
taken as axioms in the sense of entailing all the code’s propositions on 
principle. For general principles as the system’s basic propositions may, by 
formulating the objectives and the overall ethos of the entire regulation, greatly 
delimit the circle of instrumental behaviours to be specified and legally 
qualified by the said regulation, without, however, defining them, as there is 
  
 82 Klaus: op. cit. 319. 
 83 Cf. Wróblewski: System of Norms …, op. cit. 226–227. 
 84 Cf. Szabó, I.: Régi és új kérdések a szocialista jogelméletben [Old and new questions 
in socialist legal theory]. In his Szocialista jogelmélet–népi demokratikus jog [Socialist 
legal theory–people’s democratic law]. Budapest, 1967, 119–120; and also Wróblewski, J.: 
The General Principles of Law. In: Rapports polonais présentés au sixième Congrès 
international de Droit compare. Varsovie, 1962, 220–222. 
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no exclusive, categorical equivalence between the objective set and the way 
the law may intend to reach it.85 
 What is therefore proper to legal systems–instead of formal derivation and 
consequence–is but a mutual contentual relationship, within which eventual 
contradictions or disconformities between principles and actual realisations 
can quite well be detected, but not in a way to be substituted by relations of 
mutual definition and inferability. 
 Finally, two further basic characteristics should as well be mentioned, ones 
that are requirements formulated in axiomatic systems as attached directly to 
their systemic character (rather than to their deductivity) and thus are asserted 
in law far more directly. The “requirements of deductive systems have different 
theoretical-cognitive ‘force’ ”–according to science theory. “The most important 
of them is the requirement of consistency since otherwise the system is ruined. 
The other requirements have less importance.”86 Well, this requirement can be 
formulated easily. An axiomatic system is consistent if it “does not contain two 
statements, one of which is the negation of the other.” Or, in other words, if 
“of any two contradictory sentences at least one cannot be proved.”87 If, there-
fore, consistency means that “it is not possible to prove from the given axioms 
both a certain formula X and the logical contradiction to X”,88 then, in the 
domain of law, this will correspond to the requirement that, within the system, 
any behaviour can be qualified either as X or as non-X. That is, the same 
behaviour cannot be regarded as lawful and unlawful by the same system at the 
same time. Or, freedom from contradictions is of an extraordinary signifi-
cance in and for law. In the technological elaboration of its store of instruments, 
this is one of the primary conditions of the law’s internal “morality”, that is, 
of its efficient socio-political functioning.89 Simultaneously, this is also a 
presumed and necessarily postulated element of the legislator’s rationality 
  
 85 Cf., by the author: The Preamble: A Question of Jurisprudence. Acta Juridica 
Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 12 (1971) 1–2, 101–128. 
 86 Sadovskij: op. cit. 202. 
 87 Sadovskij: op. cit. 200 and Tarski, A.: Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology 
of Deductive Sciences. 2nd American ed., New York, 1994, 125. 
 88 Klaus: op. cit. 300. 
 89 The freedom of contradictions was defined as the basic feature of law (which has to 
be “an expression coherent in itself”) by Engels, and as one of the preconditions of the 
law’s “inner morality”, by Fuller, L. L.: The Morality of Law. New Haven–London, 1965, 
65–70. For the latter, cf., by the author: Reflections on Law and on its Inner Morality. 
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto, 62 (1985) 3, 439–451 and The Inner 
Morality of Law. Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 29 (1987) 1–2, 240–245. 
28 CSABA VARGA 
  
that allows and also necessitates kinds of interpretation which can prevent any 
contradiction that there may still be.90 
 In connection with consistency, the feature of categoricity as a specifically 
formulated prerequisite for freedom from contradictions has also to be 
mentioned. As known, in the mid-19th century, János Bolyai and Nicolai 
Ivanovich Lobatchevsky proved on Euclidean geometry, the very first system 
of axioms ever elaborated in scientific development, that all its abstract perfection 
notwithstanding, it is not the exclusively feasible system of geometry, for when 
the system gets reorganised by changing its axiom(s) of, e.g., parallelism, the 
result can again be a system freed from contradictions which, among its 
boundaries, provides a complete answer to all questions that can at all be 
raised within the said system of geometry. Accordingly, we can state that a 
system “is not categorical, if a thesis p and also its logical negation can be 
proposed in an axiomatic system”.91 Well, while–as we have seen–in axiomatics 
it might have been conspicuous that Euclid’s geometry was proved not to be 
categorical for, e.g., parallelism, categoricity in and for law may turn out to be 
of interest first of all in a positive sense. Namely, in law there are so-called 
basic principles, mostly particular to given types of legal arrangements.92 And 
this may lead us to the tentative conclusion that, on the last analysis, the legal 
system is a function of various “basic principles” taken as general theses, 
characterised by categoricity. However, legal systems are neither static, nor 
rigidified, and we know from legal sociology how contradictory tendencies 
law may incorporate and what tensions it may endure until a new start (e.g., by 
a revolution) brings a break into the system’s development.93 Or, the flexibility 
of legal systems is also a function of their categoricity to a considerable extent. 
 Along with consistency, another basic feature of axiomatic systems is the 
requirement of completeness. “A formal system is semantically complete in the 
absolute sense if every sentence, having value in reference to any model of this 
system, is inferable in it.” That is, if “every sentence which is formulated by 
  
 90 Cf. Nowak, L.: Próba metodologicznej charakterystyki prawoznawstwa [Essay on 
the methodological characteristics of legal knowledge]. Poznan, 1968, 199–200. 
 91 Klaus: op. cit. 322.  
 92 For the socio-political bounds of–especially socialist–basic principles, see, by Szabó, 
I.: A szocialista jog [Socialist law]. Budapest, 1963, 454 and 72–79 and Régi és új 
kérdések… [Old and new questions…]. op. cit. 122–124. For some principles universalised 
and thereby also self-emptying, see Péteri, Z.: The Nature of the General Principles of 
Law. In: Szabó, I. (ed.): Studies in Jurisprudence for the Sixth International Congress of 
Comparative Law. Budapest, 1962, 43–59. 
 93 Cf., e.g., Lévy-Bruhl, H.: Tensions et conflits au sein d’un même système juridique. 
Cahiers internationaux de Sociologie, 30 (1961), 35–46. 
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employing the terms of this theory can be proved or disproved within it.”94 
Searching for the equivalent of axiomatic completeness in law, we can formulate 
that a legal system is complete if the qualification of any behaviour covered by 
the regulation of the given system can be deductively inferred from its 
propositions. The opposite of completeness is obviously incompleteness, the 
case of which can be established depending on how we define the system’s 
boundaries to which it is related. Usual definitions relate it to theses either 
drawn “from the system’s area” or “correctly formulated in terms of the 
system”.95 This way, applying axiomatism to law, we are to see that such a 
logical approach corresponds to the positivistic understanding of gaps in law: 
both define the system’s boundaries from inside, by the system’s own terms. 
Opposed to it, a sociological approach may result in a “more complete” 
concept of completeness, as it draws its boundaries from outside, by assessing 
the widely felt demands of social reality.96 
 
3. Conclusion: Ideals and the Dialectics of Substantivity 
 
With the present investigations concluded, it seems that the creed of David 
Hilbert, one of perhaps the greatest representatives of modern mathematics–
according to which “I believe that all that can at all be an object of scholarly 
thought is, by achieving its maturity for theory-building, suitable for axiomatic 
elaboration and thereby also for mathematisation.”97–is based on an unproved 
and unprovable generalisation. Albeit it is true in a figurative sense that “the 
block is not on the mason’s side, but against him, and the first thing that 
happens in its shaping seems the most unnatural of all”,98 yet it is not merely 
the inertia of the material concerned I mean by referring to law. For legal systems 
are truly dynamic systems thoroughly built on substantive interconnections. 
Therefore they resist axiomatisation.99 At the same time, the substantivity of 
inherently dialectic interrelations may not prevent theoretical reconstruction 
from treating legal systems in their sui generis type of intellectual representa-
  
 94 Sadovskij: op. cit. 202 and Tarski : op. cit. 135. 
 95 Klaus: op. cit. 321–322. 
 96 For the dichotomic approach of gaps in law and their feasible synthesis, see, by the 
author: Quelques questions méthodologiques…, op. cit. 205–241. 
 97 Hilbert, D.: Axiomatisches Denken. Mathematische Annalen, 78 (1918), 415. 
 98 Mann, T.: The Tables of the Law. [Das Gesetz, 1944] New York, 1945, section 15, 36. 
 99 Peczenik, A.: Jumps and Logic in the Law: What can one Expect from Logical 
Models of Legal Argumentation? Artificial Intelligence and Law, 4 (1996) 3–4, 297–329 
will abstract his final message as follows: “A strict and formal logical analysis cannot give 
us the full grasp of legal rationality.” 
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tions within which “the Parts altogether define the Whole by defining each 
other mutually”. For such a system–as the arguments holds on100–may prove to 
be “not only an organised but an organising unit to finally organise itself into 
one single entity with Parts organised by the Whole and the Whole prevailing 
through the Parts organised”.101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 100 Bartók: op. cit. 19. 
 101 A research carried out thanks to and within the Project K62382 financed by the 
Hungarian Scientific Research Fund. 
